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A GENERAL APPROACH
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Classical Dualism ModernizedA Proposal
1. What is psycho-physical dualism? What defines an opinion or 
theory as (psycho-physically) dualistic! -  It entails the thesis that 
some mental entity is wholly nonphysical. (In what follows, the 
word “physical” -  by itself, without modifier -  will be used in the 
sense of “at least partly physical”, “nonphysical”, therefore, in 
the sense of “not at least partly physical”, in other words, in the 
sense of “wholly nonphysical”.)
2. What defines an opinion or theory as evewr-dualistic, property- 
dualistic, ««¿stance-dualistic? -  It entails the thesis that some 
mental event, property, substance is (wholly) nonphysical.
3. The neo-Cartesian argument fo r  substance dualism', (a) It is 
possible that my consciousness and I, the subject of that 
consciousness, exist in just the (consciousness-intrinsic) way in 
which we in fact exist without anything physical existing, (b) If 1 
am physical, then I am necessarily physical. Therefore (from (a) 
and (b)): (c) I am not physical, (d) I am a conscious causally
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active individual that is wholly present at any moment at which it 
exists, in other words: I am a conscious causally active individual 
that does not have any temporal parts. Therefore (from (c) and 
(d)): (e) I am a nonphysical substance. (Note that I do not believe 
that independent existence is necessary for substancehood; for if 
independent existence were necessary for substancehood, then 
this would leave us with far too few substances -  perhaps with no 
more than one substance: Spinoza’s “Deus sive Natura”.)
4. The neo-Cartesian argument for substance dualism pursues the 
strategy of showing that the physical is not necessary for 
consciousness. Another argument for dualism, which I would like 
to call “the Chalmers-argument for dualism” (after David 
Chalmers who proposed arguments somewhat similar to it) 
pursues the strategy of showing that the physical is not sufficient 
for consciousness: (a') It is possible that the physical world exists 
in just the (physical) way it in fact exists without my 
consciousness existing, (b') But if my consciousness is physical 
and exists, then it is not possible that the physical worlds exists in 
just the way it in facts exists without my consciousness existing. 
Therefore (from (a') and (b')): (c') My consciousness is not 
physical or does not exist, (d ') My consciousness exists. 
Therefore (from (c') and (d')): (e') My consciousness is not 
physical.
5. Like the Chalmers-argument, the neo-Cartesian argument is an 
a priori argument. But can its conclusion also be confirmed in an 
a posteriori way? -  It can be, since there is a role for nonphysical 
substances to play within the economy of biological evolution. If 
there is macrophysical indetermination in the world and if not all 
of this indetermination is ultimately decided one way or another 
by pure chance, then there is room for consciousness-guided 
decision makers in the world, connected to living organisms due 
to the emergence of nervous systems, and directed by evolution, 
by natural selection, to make such choices among the alternatives 
left open by macrophysical indetermination as are favorable to 
the survival o f their organisms.
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6. The nonphysical nature of these consciousness-guided decision 
makers is a consequence of the fact that it is not possible to 
reduce macro- or microphysical indetermination -  i.e., to decide 
cases of physical indetermination, one way or another -  by an 
input of further physical determination. Given that physics is 
complete, such further input would violate the law of the 
preservation of energy. There remains, therefore, only chance or 
nonphysical agency to decide cases of physical indetermination. 
It is unjustified -  it would be sheer dogmatism -  to conclude a 
priori that it always must be chance that decides cases of physical 
indetermination.
7. A wholly nonphysical conscious agent that is connected to a 
living organism, a living body, may yet have purely physical 
properties. Such properties are had by such an agent in virtue of 
being, in the first instance, properties of the agent’s body. There 
is nothing untoward in this at all. It is like saying that I am flying 
to Boston, when, in the most literal interpretation, only the plane 
I am travelling with is flying to Boston. It is true that a wholly 
nonphysical conscious agent does not have purely physical 
properties in the most direct way possible, but it is not true that 
such an agent does not really have those properties, or has them 
only metaphorically speaking.
8. A wholly nonphysical conscious agent can have purely 
physical properties; it can also exert causation on the purely 
physical. Deciding cases of macrophysical indetermination as one 
sees fit in conscious view of certain purposes -  doing so, no 
doubt, by means o f  deciding cases of microphysical 
indetermination (but without conscious intention: merely 
instrumentally) — is, precisely, an exerting o f causation on the 
purely physical', the outcome is the realization of a certain 
physical event.
9. But how could this be possible? Much can be said about this, 
and much have I said about it. All that one must allow a wholly 
nonphysical agent if it is to have some causal influence of its own 
on the purely physical is the ability to select and to decide matters 
in the realm of alternative physical possibilities -  truly to do so.
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that is, to do so in a way that is ontologically relevant, which 
means: to do so in a way that is neither overdeterminative nor 
epiphenomenal. This implies: exercising the ability to select and 
to decide matters in the realm of alternative physical possibilities 
must be up to the agent', otherwise, something other than the 
agent would be the ultimate source of the causal influence 
ostensibly exerted by the agent on the purely physical.
10. If somebody insists that he does not understand how such 
things could be possible, he may do so; after all he is only 
admitting an inability. The illegitimate step is to conclude that 
something is impossible from the fact that one does not 
understand how it could be possible. In fact there are many things 
which are such that we do not understand how they can be 
possible, without our doubting in any way that they are possible, 
because we firmly believe that they are actual. For example, I, 
for my part, do not understand how it can be possible that a 
gravitational force is attached to matter; but I do not doubt that 
this is possible, since I do not doubt that it is actually the case. If I 
argued that it cannot be that a gravitational force is attached to 
matter because I do not understand how this could be possible, I 
would not get much applause. Why, I wonder, do people get 
applauded who conclude that a causal influence of the purely 
nonphysical on the purely physical is impossible because they do 
not understand how it could be possible?
11. If wholly nonphysical agent-causation that molds, to some 
extent, the purely physical realm were indeed something o f which 
the possibility is impossible for us to understand, it yet would be 
— would have to be — an actuality for us. For there are persuasive 
arguments to the conclusion that we are wholly nonphysical 
substances, and certainly we cannot help considering ourselves as 
agents in the purely physical realm, doers o f purely physical 
deeds, for which we are, sometimes, fully responsible. We also 
consider most other people in this light, and, in fact, we are 
ourselves considered by most other people in this light. But our 
full responsibility, even mere responsibility, for something that 
happens in the purely physical realm — the responsibility we
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believe in -  can only be had if wholly nonphysical agent­
causation molds to some extent the purely physical realm.
12. The general question is how a purely nonphysical subject 
with its purely nonphysical consciousness is related to its 
organism, it being nothing other than the soul of that organism. 
Here is a fact: what impairs the nervous system of an organism -  
in particular, its brain -  impairs the subject of this organism, 
usually in both of its functions: as subject of conscious 
experience, and as subject of conscious action. We all know the 
horrible consequences of Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s 
disease. Thus, there is indeed a location -  or more accurately 
speaking: a field of emergence -  in the physical body for the 
nonphysical soul. This is the nervous system.
13. The nonphysical soul of an organism is, on the one hand, the 
product of the organism’s nervous system and, within the limits 
of the natural order, absolutely dependent on that system for its 
existence. But on the other hand, the main raison d ’etre of the 
nervous system, once it reaches a certain degree of complexity, is 
precisely to bring forth the nonphysical soul of the organism, 
which serves the organism as a conscious, at least rudimentarily 
rational center of decision making, increasing the organism’s 
chances of survival (and therewith also the chances of survival of 
the organism’s species).
14. This is the function of the soul in the natural order, its 
biological function. But 1 add that for some souls there may be 
more in store than just the natural order.
15. That the natural function of the soul is this: to be a 
nonphysical organ of the organism, contributing substantially to 
the organism’s survival, is strikingly shown by the fact that what 
the soul naturally desires and takes pleasure in is -  not always, 
but usually (there is no perfect fit in biological evolution) — good 
for the organism; whereas what the soul naturally shuns and takes 
displeasure in is -  not always, but usually -  had for the organism. 
People who make an epiphenomenon out of consciousness and 
declare that the subject of consciousness, if it exists at all. is a
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totally ineffective ghost in a machine that runs all by itself, have 
no satisfactory explanation for this striking fact.
16. The relationship of organism and soul has a causal side, 
which, in turn, has two sides: foundational causality: this is what 
the organism does fo r  -  and sometimes: to -  the soul, and 
directional causality: this is what the soul does for -  and 
sometimes: to -  the organism. However, this two-sided causality 
is not the only link between the two.
17. The organism that a conscious soul emerges from is also the 
first and nearest intentional object of it, embedded in its 
consciousness in such a way that the soul (or, in other words, the 
subject of experience and agency) experiences itself as being 
virtually in -  virtually inhabiting -  the organism it emerges from.
18. In addition to perceptual and sensory aspects, the soul’s 
“intimacy of intentionality” with its organism also has emotional 
and volitional aspects. The organism is the natural first object of 
care for its soul — and this not merely in the soul’s experience, 
not epiphenomenally, but, as I have argued, effectively.
19. More than a brief proposal for modernizing classical dualism 
can be found in my publications on the philosophy of mind. 
These publications are (in chronological order):
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